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Summary
In the last few years, several innovations have appeared in mortgage
finance which are designed to improve the flow of funds into mortgage lending.
One of those innovations is the FHLMC Sixty Day Auction. This paper analyzes
this auction by developing a bidding model for use by participating mortgage
banking firms. Next, historical frequencies are used to establish the proba-
bility of acceptance for any particular bid, given the predicted low accepted
bid. It is then shown how the mortgage banking firm can utilize the model,
given its individual needs.
^Presented at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Eastern Finance Association,
Savannah, Georgia, April 18, 1980.

A BID STRATEGY FOR THE FHLMC SIXTY DAY AUCTION
Introduction
In the last few years, several innovations have appeared in mortage
finance which are designed to improve the flow of funds into mortgage lending.
One intermediary involved in these activities is the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation (FHLMC). The FHLMC is a corporate entity, under the
sponsorship of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, that provides a national
secondary market facility for conventional mortgages. Through its secondary
market operations, the FHLMC furnishes a source of liquidity for mortgage
lenders, with a major portion of this support provided through a weekly bid
pricing program. Through its issuance of forward purchase commitments, the
FHLMC assures lenders of a permanent investor (at a set yield) for conven-
tional mortgages originated over specified periods of time, regardless of
prevailing money market and housing conditions.
Since recent legislation has added mortgage banking firms (MBF's) to
2 3
the FHLMC's list of approved lenders (sellers) ' , it is appropriate to
For a discussion of all the placement options available to mortgage
lenders, see Sears, Steve, "Mortgage Placement Alternatives," North Carolina
Investment Institute Working Papers , UNC (1979).
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Housing and Community Development Amendments #53084. The amendment
passed in late 1978 gives mortgage banking firms (MBF's) access to the
placement opportunities provided by the FHLMC. The FHLMC has until May 31,
1979 to provide the necessary eligibility standards. Some of the areas in
which it is anticipated that guidelines will be forthcoming are:
a. Minimum net worth requirements.
b. Authority to conduct audits (to be carried out by independent public
accountants) of the financial statements of prospective MBF participants
consider a strategy model for the MBF seeking to use the auction as a place-
ment alternative. This paper begins by covering the mechanics of the auction
and highlighting the portfolio considerations of the MBF. On this basis, an
econometric model is developed to assist in predicting the low accepted
auction bid. Next, historical frequencies are used to establish the proba-
bility of acceptance for any particular bid given the predicted low accepted
bid. With the prediction and related probability distribution, the MBF can
develop a bid strategy based on its individual needs (as described more fully
in a subsequent section).
4
Mechanics of the Auction
Through its weekly bid pricing auction, the FHLMC issues forward
optional commitments (two months) for the purchase of single-family, conven-
tional mortgage loans from originating lenders. Basically, lenders offer to
sell mortgages to the FHLMC at specified yields. The FHLMC then evaluates
these offers, determines the amount of mortgages it will purchase (i.e., the
c. Provision that MBF's issue the same warranties, with respect to loans
sold to the FHLMC, that other sellers (i.e., savings and loan associ-
ations) currently provide.
d. FHLMC inspection of the office of participating MBF facilities.
e. Review of the prior experience of the MBF's.
f. Capital contributions to the FHLMC by MBF's.
g. The total amount of the FHLMC's purchases allowed in aggregate to MBF's
will be limited to a predetermined percentage of total purchaser.
3
Although prior to this time MBF's were not permitted to deal directly
with the FHLMC, many utilized (indirectly) the weekly auction through commer-
cialized banking activities of parent holding companies.
4
Sources include: The Mortgage Corporation, Mortgage Participation
Certificates , 1977; The Mortgage Corporation, Bid Pricing - A Market Reflection ,
1978.
3yields it will accept) and then issues forward optional commitments to the
successful bidders.
Such auctions are conducted on consecutive Fridays with participation
5
limited to FHLMC-approved lenders (sellers). Bids must be telephoned between
the hours of 11:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m., Washington, D.C. time, on the day of the
auction. Competitive bids submitted by the seller must be net of the 3/8 of
1% servicing fee (which will be received by the seller for servicing the mort-
gage, should the bid be accepted by the FHLMC).
A single seller may submit up to five competitive bids in each auction,
subject to certain requirements:
1. The maximum dollar amount for any single bid is $3 million per auction.
A seller may divide its bid into as many as five purchase contracts, provided
all are executed at the same net yield and the total of the five bids does not
exceed $3 million.
2. The minimum dollar amount that may be bid (whether as one bid or as
many as five bids) is $10,000 per auction.
Prior to recent legislation (Note 2), the FHLMC purchased mortgages from
any Federal Home Loan Bank, the Federal Savings and Loan Corporation, any
member of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, any other financial institution
(the deposits of which are insured by an agency of the United States), and
from certain financial institutions (the deposits of which are insured under
state law).
This is in contrast with the bidding requirements of the Federal National
Mortgage Association's (FNMA) Free Market System auctions in which competitive
bids include , in the yield, 3/8 of 1% servicing fee.
Lenders are also permitted to bid non-competitively in the auction. In
doing so, the lender must also meet certain requirements.
a. A non-competitive bid can be divided into as many as five purchase
contracts, provided the total dollar amount is not less than $100,000
or greater than $500,000.
b. A seller cannot bid both competitively and non-competitively in the
same auction.
c. Non-competitive bids are due on the Wednesday following the Friday
auction.
d. The seller is guaranteed that its bid will be accepted, but it
agrees to accept the weighted average yield of all bids accepted by
the FHLMC for that auction (which may be significantly greater than
the low accepted bid).
3. Non-members of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board System are assessed
a bid fee of 1/2 of 1%.
Portfolio Considerations
The MBF is a non-depository intermediary whose principal activity is
the originating and servicing of loans secured either by commerical or resi-
dential real estate. The firm operates by taking loan applications (from
either developers or individual borrowers), committing funds to these borrowers,
closing the loans with funds normally borrowed through bank lines of credit
o
and finally selling a package of loans to permanent investors. The proceeds
from sale, in excess of credit advances, along with servicing fee, float and
warehousing arbitage, represent income.
In handling loan originations and sales, the mortgage banker can follow
one of three general patterns:
1. Origination without commitment - the mortgage loan is originated and
held in the MBF's investment portfolio until a final lender can be located.
Such a procedure creates two problems for the firm:
a. A final lender may not be found, in time, to provide funds for
the repayment of the commercial bank warehousing line.
b. Upward shifts in market interest rates between the MBF's
commitment and the final sale of the loan package may produce
a marketing loss upon subsequent sale (i.e., require a discount
on final sale).
o
McKinnon, H. Alexander, Miles, Mike, and McLeod, Robert W, "An
Evaluation Model to Improve Performance in FNMA Auction," The Mortgage
Banker (March, 1978), p. 54.
2. Mandatory commitment - the mortgage loan is originated after all
arrangements are settled with a permanent lender or other secondary market
source. In this case, the MBF must deliver the loan. This particular
origination alternative provides the firm with protection against the risks
cited above. It insures the firm that funds will be available when needed
and it guarantees a floor (and ceiling) on the price to be received for the
mortgage loan. On the other hand, such a commitment does not protect the
firm from downward shifts in interest rates. Such shifts could result in the
firm originating loans at a rate less than the yield promised to the final
lender and consequently lead to a marketing loss on disposition.
3. Optional commitment - the mortgage loan is still originated after
all arrangements are settled with the permanent investor; yet final delivery
is optional, pending arrangement of a more favorable offer. This method
operates in a manner similar to the mandatory commitment, but with insulation
against downward interest rate shifts during the warehousing period. However,
if no new permanent lender can be located, the protection against downward
interest rate shifts is obtained only at the expense of losing protection
against problem "a" listed above.
In assessing the relative merits of these alternatives, one should note
that the basic philosophy of the MBF is to attempt to maximize production
(loan originations) because this, in turn, leads to the greatest servicing
revenue (which is the largest profit item). Consequently, MBF's seek to
obtain coverage for most of their originations and thus avoid the two risks
Q
noted above. As a result, these two risks place constraints on the firm's
operations.
g
At times, a firm will originate in anticipation of finding coverage at
a later date. However, the typical MBF will incorporate a risk constraint
in its decision-making process to limit the amount of its uncovered portfolio.
Historically, MBF's have handled these constraints through the secondary
market private commitment process. But , the extent to which this process can
be utilized has greatly diminished via the changing economic conditions of
the late 1960's and early 1970's. (Life insurance companies, as well as other
private lenders, have been able to locate more attractive investment oppor-
tunities.) As a result, the MBF has been forced to look elsewhere for
alternative risk-shifting mechanisms.
The newest such alternative is the FHLMC weekly bid pricing program. This
auction can provide the firm with the necessary time-risk shifting mechanism
that was previously available in the private sector. However, the two
commitment alternatives differ in at least one important respect. Under the
private commitmem:, the firm was readily assured of purchase by the permanent
lender. Under the FHLMC 60 day commitment, the firm must bid for the right
to sell its package of loans. Hence, there is less assurance of the availability
of funds (at a set price) to meet liquidity needs. Furthermore, if the firm's
bid is accepted at a higher yield than competitive mortgage lenders, it will
be at a competitive disadvantage in loan origination. Therefore, it behooves
the firm to have a strategy model for participation in this new placement
auction. A model is needed to estimate the lowest yield that will be accepted
by the FHLMC and then establish a probability of acceptance around this
expected low bid. The MBF can then bid "optimally," given its existing port-
folio, expected mortgage loan demand, and its willingness to assume the
aforementioned risks.
In addition, it provides another outlet for the MBF's conventional loan
portfolio. Currently, the FNMA FMS auction is the principal conventional
placement device for MBF's,
The Proposed Model
The model is designed to achieve two goals:
1. Capacity for application in the real world. The input requirements
must be such that the MBF can utilize the model as a decision aid in the
placement of its conventional loan portfolio.
2. Theoretical appeal. The determinants of the low accepted bid in
the upcoming weekly auction should be the most logical from an economic
theory perspective.
Theoretical determinants
Since the variable to be determined (the low accepted bid in the upcoming
auction) is expressed in interest rate form, economic theory can be used to
develop a set of suitable determinants. Certainly, two logical determinants
should be the demand for and the supply of mortgage funds.
Since markets are typically interrelated, the interest rate on mortgages
should also be a function of demand/supply conditions in other financial
markets. Consequently, the model should attempt to capture this effect. Also
embodied in such a financial market interest rate is the financial community's
expectation of inflation. With mortgage loans denominated in nominal (as
opposed to real) terms, a lender is interested in changes in the purchasing
power of the returned principal. Therefore, if the FHLMC anticipates price
increases, it could be expected to require compensation for this in the bids
it is willing to accept. Again using an interest rate from a competitive
Obviously, this creates a "chicken-egg" problem. The direction of
causality between yield and supply/demand is probably dual. Thus, a more
sophisticated model would be one in which all three were determined endo-
genously. However, no such model, which remains practically applicable, has
yet been devised.
8financial market will capture both the interaction of the mortgage market with
other markets and a general expectation of inflation,
A final determinant should measure the impact of the FHLMC upon the
auction results. With the FHLMC acting as a secondary market buffer, some
subsidizing can be expected from period to period. The MBF needs to take note
of this in bid preparation.
Variable choices .
The aggregate volume of new construction put in place and changes in the
supply of savings are chosen are proxies for mortgage demand and supply. The
Commerce Department provides estimates of new construction while the supply
of savings can be measured as the difference between M~ and M, , i.e., savings
deposits at both savings and loans and commercial banks as reported in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
The effects of alternative money and capital market demand/supply con-
ditions is represented by the most recently known yield on three to five
year government bonds. Changes in this yield are used in the model to
temper the prediction of flows between markets and adjustments to the expec-
tation of inflation. (This rate is also reported in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin.)
The government subsidizing variable is represented as the spread between
the current market level of mortgage rates (as measured by the FHLBB new homes
series) and the previous auction's weighted average yield of accepted bids.
12
Sources for this data include: The Federal Reserve Bulletin
,
The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal , and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation.
To some extent, movement in this spread captures the "smoothing" intent of
the FHLMC in the low bid acceptance decision.
Measurement problems
There are several problems with the measurement of the aforementioned
determinants. First of all, the lastest levels of several of the variables
13
are only known with a considerable lag. Consequently, in specifying the
model, one must either assume that the latest information available is the
most relevant or generate expectations concerning current (unknown) levels.
The authors decided to examine both the latest reported level and the
expected (current) level with expectations generated via simple extrapolation
14
from known levels and by Box-Jenkins time series techniques.
Some of the variables are available only in monthly form, presenting
an additional problem. This is especially troublesome due to the fact that
the FHLMC 60 day commitment auction is conducted weekly. For these variables,
two series were also created. One series used only the monthly figures and
resulted in values being used four or five times (for those months in which
13
The latest levels of the demand and supply variables are known only
after a lag of about six to eight weeks.
Box-Jenkins is a technique of modeling and forecasting in which the
autocorrelation functions of a particular time series (e.g., changes in
M3-M-, ) are analyzed to determine the appropriate process describing the series,
Processes are typically categorized as autoregressive, moving average, or a
combination of both, where seasonality may or may not be present and differ-
encing may be required.
For those variables requiring such analysis, the authors analyzed the
historical series and determined a model for each. Once determined, the
model was used to generate forecasts for the period: June 1977 - December
1978 (the period of time covered by the study). Original forecasts were
updated as new information became available. Thus, variables were created
and expressed entirely in expectational form.
10
five auctions were held). A second series utilized interpolated values.
Methodology and organization of the study
The study was conducted over the period extending from June 1977 -
December 1978. The period is marked by fluctuating mortgage yields which
reached peaks in early 1979.
The period extending from June 1977 - September 1978 (70 auctions) was
used for parameter estimation. For the weekly auction, a regression equation
was estimated in the hypothesized format. Results from the theoretical model
were compared to the naive model of using the previous auction's accepted low
bid as the best guess for the upcoming auction's results. The hypothesis
is that the expanded model will out-perform the naive version over the test
period and, in the process, produce a set of theoretically appealing deter-
minants.
Secondly, the parameter estimates from the June 1977 - September 1978
period are used with observations on the pre-determined variables in the
test period (October 1978 - December 1978) to produce forecasted (expected)
values for the low accepted bids. These forecasts were then compared to actual
15
Although arbitrary, the authors assumed the monthly level to be taken
at the midpoint of the month. Interpolated values were then created to fall
on the day of the auctions. In creating such values, interpolated values
were created from known information at the time of the auction to assure that
the final model would be useable by the practicing MBF.
The authors note certain regulatory changes which were partially
implemented over the sample period. (For a background discussion, see the
Hunt Commission and FINE Studies.)
Even though the FHLMC weekly auction represents a new placement device
for the MBF, it is likely that some firms will employ this strategy in the
FNMA FMS auctions. Although effective in a fairly stable market, the naive
strategy becomes less satisfactory in a more volatile market.
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auction results in the period October 1978 - December 1978 to test the
predictive capacity of the model.
Finally, it is demonstrated that probabilities can be associated with a
particular bid being accepted. When combined with a given firm's inventory
of originated loans, existing unexpired commitments and estimates of mortgage
demand, these probabilities provide the basis for a bid strategy.
Multiple Regression Model
The final forms of the supply and demand variables in the model were
produced by extrapolations via Box-Jenkins techniques. Furthermore, it was
found that an interpolated series provided more accurate predictions than
simply using the same observation at successive' points in the time series.
For the final equation, an examination of the correlation matrix reveals
18
no serious multi col linearity problems. An examination of the Durbin-Watson
statistic does reveal the presence of first-order autocorrelation. This was
19
corrected and the equation was placed in its final form:
18
Again, a highly colinear relationship exists between the substitution
(three to five year government bond yield) rate and inflation. Since govern-
ment bond yields are expressed in nominal terms, they include a real rate
component plus a premium for expected inflation. With this in mind, the
authors chose to use the government bond yield to represent both supply/demand
interrelationships as well as expected inflation.
19
Many authors posit that it is more important to predict "changes," rather
than "levels." In a subsequent test, the model was analyzed strictly in terms
of changes. As expected, the predictive power of the change model was found
to be less than the level form. The adjusted R^ figures for the ratio and
difference forms of this model are .5748 and .3692, respectively, and all
variables have their hypothesized signs.
The change form of the expanded model provides greater predictive
power than a naive model of no change, where the hypothesis is that last period's
accepted low bid can be used as the best guess for this period's low accepted
bid. To test this, the authors regressed the upcoming low bid against the
previous low bid (with its coefficient restricted to 1 ) . The relationship was
significant, but at a much lower level than the changes form of the expanded
model. The authors choose to use the level (rather than change) form of the
model because this is the form with which most MBF decision makers are familiar.
12
Y = 8.516190 + .203860 X
]
- .525457 X
2
-.056485 X
3
+ .000001 X
4
- .222042 X
5
where:
Y = low accepted bid
X, = current yield on three - five year U.S. Government bonds;
X2
= changes in X, over the most recent one-week period;
X
3
= change in mortgage supply over the last week preceding the
auction (Box-Jenkins expectation), as measured by changes
in M
3
- M-j
;
X, = mortgage demand in the previous week (Box-Jenkins expectation),
as measured by new construction put in place;
and Xc = spread between the latest known level of mortgage interest
rates (as measured by the FHLBB new-homes series) and the
previous auction's weighted average yield on accepted bids.
Naive Model
A naive form of the regression model was estimated as a check on the
predictive power of the expanded (multiple regression) model. In this effort,
a number of econometric problems arose which required correction. First of
all, the presence of a dependent variable used in an explanatory role renders
the Durbin-Watson statistic invalid as a measure of first-order autocorrelation.
Secondly, the combination of a lagged endogenous variable with an autoregressive
error term renders ordinary regression parameter estimates which are biased
and inconsistent. The authors took the necessary steps in the estimation
20
procedure to correct for these problems.
20
As a further test, the authors compared a Box-Jenkins form of the naive
model to the expanded version. The expanded version also out-performed the
13
Discussion of Parameter Estimation
The results for the first period are shown in Table I. As can be seen
from the table, the multiple regression model provides a significant improvement
2-2 2 21
over the naive regression in terms of adjusted R , 1-R , and the x statistic.
All coefficients are significant and possess the hypothesized signs:
Increases in other financial markets'
interest rates (X,
)
in the change in X,,^}
in the supply of funds (X.J
in the demand for funds (a )
in FHLMC subsidy (X
g
)
4
indicates that the low
accepted bid will be
higher
(competition)
lower
(the expected
tempering effect)
lower
higher
lower.
A variable that perhaps needs some explanation is Xg. The negative sign implies
that as the spread between market levels of mortgage yields and the yield that
the FHLMC is willing to accept widens, the FHLMC is subsidizing the market, thus
22leading to expectations of a lower accepted yield in the upcoming auction.
Box-Jenkins model. Furthermore, the expanded version is more theoretically
appealing and better able to anticipate changes.
21 2
The x statistic is a statistical measure of the "goodness of fit" of
a relationship. For the model at hand, a large value for x indicates that the
explanatory variables form a very useful and predictive set. Thus, the larger
the x^» tne more meaningful and useful the model.
22
The reason that the previously accepted weighted average bid was used
in Xc (rather than the previously accepted low) was to avoid the aforementioned
econometric problems that plague the naive model and any model with a lagged
endogenous element. The use of the weighted average does not hinder the
relationship since it is highly correlated with the low bid and is, to some
extent, a function of the latter.
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Table I
Statistical Results
Model R2 £
Expanded .9943 11,760.4*
Naive .8552
Coefficient Results
396.8*
Expanded
Model C X-i An *3 X4 h
8.516190* .203860* -.525457*** -.056485** .000001** -.222042*
Naive
Model C it-!
.641773***
..
.930454*
where:
* = significant at .01
** = significant at .05
*** - significant at .10
xrx 5 = as previously defined
Test Period Results
Table II presents the results from using the first period parameters and
observations on the pre-determined variables for the second period to produce
a set of predicted accepted low yields. In other words, what would have hap-
pened to an MBF using the forecasting model over the test period? As a
15
further check, the first six auctions of 1979 were included to assure that the
model was capable of "picking up" the jump to record high yields.
As can be seen in Table II, the correlation between the actual low
accepted bids and those predicted by the model is quite high. The forecasted
values were within 2-3 basis points, on average , across the 19 auction test
period. Again, only those inputs which are known (or can be calculated) by
the MBF prior to each auction are used as determinants in the model.
Table II**
Forecast! ng results - using the first period results and observations
on the e>cplanatory variables in the second period (pi us the first six
auctions of 1979) to predict val ues of the respective low accepted
bids. •-
Mean Squc
Error
ired Mea
1
i Absolute
Zrror
Mean
Error
.022340
Correlation coefficient
between actual low bid
and forecasted low bid
.9918*.001375 326650
where:
* = significant at .01
** = for correct interpretat ion of the above resu Its, the reader
should note that the endogenous variable was measured in
percentage (i.e., 9.62) form, not decimal (i .e., .0962) form.
Model Refinements
One of the benefits of regression analysis is that it allows one to
attach a probability, in the form of a confidence interval, to the forecasted
16
value. Since the forecasted values are not identical to the actual low yields,
the MBF can develop a confidence interval about the predicted low yield and
thus attach a probability to a certain bid being accepted."
(As previously mentioned, the MBF faces two time-related risk problems.
As such, coverage for its portfolio position is important. Therefore, a
probability attached to a forecasted low yield will enable it to assess the
likelihood of obtaining needed coverage.)
For each of the 19 forecasts, 99%, 95%, 90%, and 75% confidence inter-
vals were constructed. In every case, the true low accepted bid fell within
the interval. This provides further evidence of the predictive power of the
model, but it does not help the MBF in assessing a true probability of accep-
tance. In fact, it suggests that the assumption of a normal distribution is
not justifiable. With this in mind, the authors have constructed a new set
of probabilities (see Table III), based upon the historical sequence of fore-
casts and true values. Even though this new set does not follow the strict
assumptions of regression analysis, it does seem to be more appropriate for
the working world of the MBF.
23
The use of confidence interval analysis requires the assumption that
the endogenous variable (Y in this model) is normally distributed. But , one
of the assumptions of regression analysis is that for a given value of X (or
for a given value of each of X] , ... X5 in this model) there is distribution
of Y which is normally distributed with mean ?.
As a resu1tA a confidence interval can be constructed about any par-
ticular forecast, Y, and can be interpreted as giving the probability that
the true or actual Y (which is unknown prior to the results of the auction)
will be contained in the interval.
The interval is constructed by taking the value from a normal proba-
bility table (for a given probability) and multiplying this number times the
standard error of the forecast (which is equivalent to a standard deviation
about a mean value). Then, the confidence interval is constructed as
Y ± this product.
24The rejection of the normal distribution confidence interval does not
imply that the assumptions of the regression model are invalid. The correct
17
Table III
(COMPARISON OF NORMAL AND HISTORICAL PROBABILITY
CONFIDENCE INTERVAL MULTIPLIERS)*
Probability of
acceptance
Assumed Normal
Distribution
1.645
Historic Actual
Relation
.95 1.075
.90 1.285 1.050
.85 1.040 .850
.80 .840 .700
.75 .675 .500
.70 .530 .400
.65 .390 .300
.60 .255 .225
.55 .130 .200
.50 .000 .050
*For correct interpretation of the table, the numbers presented should
be multiplied times the standard error of the forecast, with the resulting
product being added to the MBF's forecast of the upcoming auction's bid.
This adjusted forecast will have the indicated probability of acceptance.
For example, suppose the model presented in this paper produces an expected
low accepted bid of 10.500 for the upcoming auction, and the standard error
or standard deviation about this forecast is .05. Then, if the MBF wishes
to be 95% confident of its bid being accepted, it should submit a bid of
10.55375% (10.500 + 1.075 x .05 = 10.55375).
interpretation of a 95% confidence interval about a forecast is that if one
keeps the values of Xi , ..., X5 constant and simulates 100 different samples
of Y, each time fitting a regression model and confidence interval about the
forecast, then 95 times out of 100, the constructed interval will contain the
true value of Y. The model developed in this study has taken only one sample
of Y's (the accepted low bids for the period June 1977 - September 1978), fitted
18
Conclusion
The model described in this paper is designed to aid the MBF in the
FHLMC auction. The model is shown to out-perform the naive strategy, as well
as perform well over the test period. Since the outcome from any strategy
model is uncertain, a probability parameter has been incorporated to aid the
MBF in assessing the probability of a particular low bid being accepted.
Obviously, this is only one placement device now available to the MBF.
Further research is needed to develop strategies for other placement devices.
Ideally, a model will be forthcoming which incorporates' all of the placement
alternatives in a comprehensive inventory/portfolio management model.
a regression model, and produced one set of 19 forecasts (for the period
October 1978 - February 1979).
The historical probabilities listed in Table III were generated by
analyzing the historical sequence of forecasts and treating this set as a
simulated sample in order to produce the probabilities.




